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Strandell v. Jackson County and G. Heileman 
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.: The Failure of the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to Narrow the 
Interpretation of Rule 16 and Limit the Inherent 
Power Doctrine 
The federal district courts have been overburdened by increased 
caseloads. 1 In response, trial judges have attempted to clear the bur-
geoning dockets by taking more assertive managerial control over their 
cases in order to increase the number of early settlements.2 Many set-
tlements have been reached during the pretrial period through use of 
judicial management and extrajudicial procedures. The trend towards 
more active judicial management and alternative dispute resolution 
techniques has been applauded in many instances.8 Several inventive 
pretrial procedures, such as the summary jury trial (SJT);' court-an-
I. "By June 30, 1988, a total of 241,975 civil and criminal cases were pending before 575 
authorized district court judgeships, for an average of 473 cases per judge." ADMIN. OFF. OF THE 
U.S. CoURTS, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 5, 7, noted in, Lambros, The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 789, 
792 (1989) (footnote omitted). See R. PoSNER, THE FEDERAL CouRTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-
77 (1985) (warning that courts are dangerously overloaded). 
2. Studies show that a trial judge who "intervenes personally at an early stage to assume 
judicial control over a case and to schedule dates for completion by the parties of the principal 
pretrial steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently and with less costs and 
delay than when the parties are left to their own devices." FED. R. C1v. P. 16 advisory commit-
tee's note, 1983 amendments. 
3. See Elliott, Managerial judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 
306, 326-34 (1986) (arguing that judicial management results in more just, speedy, and efficient 
disposition of cases); Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their 
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2207-09 (1989) (noting the rise of judicial case management); 
Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 
(1988) (suggesting the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques in specialty areas of 
the law); Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 
(1984) (responding to Professor Resnik's criticism of managerial judges). But see Resnik, Failing 
Faith: Adjudicatory Procedures in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494 (1986) (criticizing the shift 
in role of judges from adjudicators to case managers); Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other 
Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
366, 385 (1986) (criticizing the unscientific evaluation of the summary jury trial and other ADR). 
4. A summary jury trial is a condensed trial proceeding (generally taking one half to one day 
to complete) in which attorneys give summarized evidence to a six-member jury. See Lambros, 
Summary jury Trial, 37 FED'N INs. & CoRP. CouNs. Q. 139, )39-48 (1987) (outlining the basic 
structure of the SJT); Lambros, The Summary jury Trial-An Alternative Method of Resolving 
Disputes, 69 jUDICATURE 286, 286 (1986) (introducing SJT as one form of ADR); Spiegel, Sum-
mary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 829 (1986) (relating Judge Speigel's successful use of the 
157 
158 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 4 
nexed arbitration/1 and the mini-trial,6 have been employed in facilitat-
ing settlements. 7 
This comment focuses on an analysis of the Seventh Circuit's rea-
soning in (1) not allowing a federal court judge to require a litigant to 
participate in a nonbinding SJT and (2) requiring a defendant corpo-
rate representative to appear at a pretrial settlement conference. The 
trial court's power to order appearance at a settlement conference and 
the court's lack of power to compel mandatory SJTs will be examined 
in light of the parameters of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the inherent power doctrine. 
The comment is organized into five sections: first, Rule 16(a) and 
(c) and the inherent power of the courts are introduced; second, as 
background for examination of the trial judge's power to manage the 
court's affairs, this comment studies the development of the inherent 
power doctrine and Rule 16 interpretation in the Seventh Circuit, fo-
cusing primarily on the facts and the reasoning behind the decisions in 
Strandell v. Jackson CountyB and G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. joseph 
Oat Corp. 9 ; third, the weaknesses of the Seventh Circuit's analysis of 
Rule 16 interpretation in the Strandell and Heileman decisions are 
examined; and fourth, the Seventh Circuit's rationale in expanding the 
inherent power doctrine is presented in the setting of Strandell and 
Heileman. The fifth section of this comment concludes that both 
Strandell and Heileman do not sufficiently limit the courts' ability to 
interpret federal rules and the inherent power doctrine and suggests 
that district courts should leave the alteration of federal procedural 
rules to the legislative branch when the alteration affects substantive 
rights. 
SJT). The SJT, an early 1980s innovation of Judge Thomas Lambros of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio, was developed to farilitate pretrial settlement and to 
reduce the overburdened federal court dockets. See Gwin, The Summary jury Trial: An Fxplana-
tion and Analysis, 52 KY. BENCH AND BAR 16 (1988). See generally Lambros, The Summary 
jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 10'l F. R.D. 461 (1984) (stating 
that the SJT "can be an effective tool in overcoming the burden of an ever increasing docket" /d. 
at 463-64.) 
5. In court-annexed arbitration. the parties are instrurted to submit their rase to an arbitra-
tor who renders a nonbinding derision. See generally Lambros, The Fut?ae of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 14 PEPPER DINE L. REV. 801, 802 (1987) (reviewing procedures involved in court-
annexed arbitration). The arbitrator's judgment is entered as an order of the court if both parties 
consent. See Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court Administered Arbitration, 
69 jUDICATIIRF 27() ( 1986). 
6. A minitrial is a proceeding in which the parties present their cases to " neutral moderator 
of their choice. See D. PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATH:ms FOR FEDERAl. DISTRICT jUDGES 76-
80 (1986) (referring to the minitrial and advocating its use in obtaining settlements). 
7. See MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LITIGATION 2D §§ 21.1-21.4 (1'!85). 
8. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987). 
9. 871 F.~d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Increased use of innovative pretrial procedures may be attributed 
to the district courts' attempts to fulfill the mandate of Rule 1 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 provides that the federal rules 
are to be construed so as to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action." 10 Unfortunately, "it could be argued 
that the application of Rule 1 's implicit test is unreasonable because, 
whatever was the case in 1938, nothing in today's world is fair, fast, 
and cheap."11 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has attempted to abide by 
the spirit of Rule 1 by granting the federal district courts leeway in 
pretrial management. However, some of the procedural practices used 
by trial judges have been questioned as not being consonant with Rule 
16. In this context, the Seventh Circuit has adjudicated two cases deal-
ing with the interpretation of Rule 16 and the inherent power doctrine. 
In Strandell, the Seventh Circuit determined that the parameters of 
Rule 16 did not allow the district court's ordering a party to submit to 
a mandatory SJT. In the subsequent Heileman case, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that Rule 16 granted district courts power to compel repre-
sented parties to appear at a pretrial settlement conference. 
A. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1938, several of the rules have been substantively amended. Perhaps 
because it needed no major improvements, Rule 16 withstood amend-
ment for over forty-five years. "A major purpose" in the rule's amend-
ment "was to recognize, and indeed to embrace, the strong trend to-
ward increased judicial management of litigation from an early stage of 
the lawsuit." 12 
Rule 16, as amended in 1983, provides in pertinent part: 
(a) PRETRIAL CoNFERENCES; OBJECTIVES. In any action, the court 
may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any un-
represented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences 
before trial for such purposes as 
(I) expediting the disposition of the action; 
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will 
not be protracted because of lack of management; 
10. FFD. R. CIV. P. 1. 
11. Nordenberg, The Future of Federal Litigation, 50 U. PnT. L. RI<V. 701, 701 (1989). 
12. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A l>ook at the Theory and Pmrtia of Rulemaking, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1'/(,9, I'JH5 (I'JH9). 
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( 5) facilitating the settlement of the case. 
(c) SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED AT PRETRIAL CoNFERENCES. The 
participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take 
action with respect to 
( 1) the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the 
elimination of frivolous claims or defenses; 
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial proce-
dures to resolve the dispute; 
(1 0) the need for adopting special procedures for managing po-
tentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex is-
sues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof 
problems; and 
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the 
action. 18 
Several members of the judiciary, and some academicians, interpret the 
amendments as advocating the movement for a judge to be more in-
volved in encouraging settlements and to be less of a neutral 
adjudicator. 14 
B. The Inherent Power Doctrine 
When one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as Rule 
16, fails to specifically address an issue, courts have often relied on 
their inherent powers to fill the gap. The inherent power doctrine 
states that federal district courts are "necessarily vested" with control 
"to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expedi-
tious disposition of cases."16 In Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 16 the 
Third Circuit defined three areas in which federal courts have utilized 
the inherent power doctrine: (1) courts have power, within an "ex-
tremely narrow range," to act "notwithstanding contrary legislative di-
rection," this power being grounded in the separation of powers doc-
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
14. See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 1986; see generally AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, STUDY 
ON "PATHS TO A 'BETTER WAY': LITIGATION, ALTERNATIVES, AND ACCOMMODATION" 90-97, 
A25-A28 (Background Paper July 1988) (encouraging judicial management) noted in Shapiro, 
supra note 12, at 1976 n.21. But see Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1095 (1984) 
(advocating that settlement should not become institutionalized); Galanter, The Emergence of the 
judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JuDICATURE 257, 258-59 (1986). 
15. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). See infra text accompanying notes 
102-19. 
16. 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane). 
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trine; (2) courts have power "necessary to the exercise of all others," of 
which the contempt power is pre-eminent; and (3) courts have power to 
"provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the per-
formance of their duties."17 The inherent power doctrine is not gov-
erned solely by Rule 16, or any other rule or statute;18 rather, the doc-
trine is innately limited to the powers minimally "necessary to the 
exercise of all others."19 
II. BACKGROUND: CASES DEALING WITH RuLE 16 AND INHERENT 
POWER 
An understanding of Rule 16 and the court's inherent power is 
necessary as background for examination of the trial judge's power to 
manage the court's affairs. Likewise, an understanding of the precursor 
cases is needed to better analyze the facts and reasoning behind the 
decisions in Strandell and Heileman. 
A. Pre-1988 Cases 
1. The Seventh Circuit cases dealing with Rule 16 and the inherent 
power doctrine 
In Link v. Wabash Railroad, 20 the Seventh Circuit stated that 
"[ c ]ourts must be free to use [pretrial procedure] and to control and 
enforce its operation. Otherwise, the orderly administration of justice 
will be removed from control of the trial court and placed in the hands 
of counsel." In affirming the Seventh Circuit Link case, the Supreme 
Court fleshed out the definitional aspects of inherent power. 21 
In two subsequent cases, the Seventh Circuit held that Rule 16's 
specific language limits a court's authority over pretrial proceedings. 
First, in ].F. Edwards Construction Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard 
Rail Corp., 22 the court did not allow for the disposition of issues of fact 
or law without fulfilling the requirements of other rules. Additionally, 
the J.F. Edwards court held that Rule 16 did not permit a trial judge 
to order counsel to stipulate to facts. Then, in Identiseal Corp. v. Posi-
tive Identification Systems, Inc., 23 the Seventh Circuit held that because 
Rule 16 is intended to be noncoerciv~, a court could not compel the 
17. /d. at 562-63; Note, Settling a Case: A Court's Inherent Power to Impose Sanctions 
Before and After Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 38 RUTGERS L. REv. 539, 546 (1986). 
18. Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31. 
19. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 34 (1812). 
20. 291 F.2d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1961), affd, 370 U.S. 626 (1962). 
21. 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). 
22. 542 F.2d 1318, 1325 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 
23. 560 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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parties to engage in further discovery. 
The Seventh Circuit continued to place limitations on actions re-
lating to Rule 16 and the inherent power. In 1978, the court com-
mented on the use of inventive experiments: "Innovative experiments 
may be admirable, and considering the heavy case loads of district 
courts, understandable, but experiments must stay within the limita-
tions of the statute."24 In 1987, the Seventh Circuit stated that "sum-
mary procedures are not designed for the resolution of factual disputes 
by judges .... Procedures designed to help lawyers settle cases are not 
appropriate for judicial resolution of contested issues."25 
In the precursor to the Seventh Circuit's Strandell case, Chief 
Judge Foreman held that Rule 16 grants trial judges the authority to 
order participation in SJTs.26 The Southern District of Illinois court's 
decision was subsequently vacated in Strandell. 
2. Views of other jurisdictions on Rule 16 and inherent power 
Other jurisdictions present views conflicting to that of the Seventh 
Circuit. One federal district court in Florida held, in Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 27 that the purpose of Rule 16 is "to allow 
courts the discretion and processes necessary for intelligent and effective 
case management and disposition." In Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. 
v. General Electric Co., 28 an Ohio court held that a court is authorized 
to order mandatory SJTs. A federal district court in Minnesota found 
it unimaginable that "the drafters of the 1983 amendments [to Rule 16] 
actually intended to strengthen courts' ability to manage their caseloads 
while at the same time intended to deny the court the power to compel 
participation by the parties to the litigation."29 
Several courts in Kentucky have commented on the inherent power 
of the court to manage its caseload; for example, in McKay v. Ashland 
Oil, Inc., the court concluded that mandatory participation in SJTs is 
within the inherent power of the trial courts. 30 Moreover, in Lockhart 
v. Patel, 31 the court held that federal courts have the authority to order 
24. Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1978). 
25. Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair, Inc., 808 F.2d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1987). 
26. Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Ill. 1987), vacated, 838 F.2d 884 
(7th Cir. 1987). 
27. 119 F.R.D. 448, 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988), cf Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 
266 (6th Cir. 1985). 
28. 117 F.R.D. 597, 599-600 (S.D. Ohio 1987). 
29. Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 607 (D. Minn. 1988). 
30. 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988); see also W. BERTELSMAN & K. PHII.IPPS, KEN-
TUCKY PRACTICE, RUI.E 16, at 20 (Supp. 1987); Gwin, supra note 4, at 16. 
31. 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987). 
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the attendance of attorneys, parties and insurers at settlement confer-
ences, and that this authority "is so well established as to be beyond 
doubt." 32 In this context, the Lockhart court intimated that the adop-
tion of means to reduce docket pressures could take the form of SJTs.33 
B. Strandell v. Jackson County 
Until 1987, the general practice of compulsory SJTs remained un-
challenged in several jurisdictions. 34 In Strandell, the Seventh Circuit 
held that Rule 16 did not authorize a court to compel parties to partici-
pate in a nonbinding SJT.35 This case is significant because it departs 
from the expansion of the inherent power doctrine. Furthermore, the 
Strandell decision imposes boundaries on the interpretation of Rule 
16.36 
1. The facts in Strandell 
At the trial level of Strandell, the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Illinois believed it could mandate a SJT.37 The 
attorney for the civil rights plaintiffs refused to participate in a SJT 
ordered by the district court judge. Plaintiffs' counsel argued that by 
participating in the compulsory SJT, he would reveal privileged work 
product-testimonies of witnesses which defense counsel could have 
readily obtained through regular discovery process but which defense 
counsel failed to do. 38 More significantly, plaintiffs' counsel also argued 
that the district court lacked the power to compel him to engage in a 
nonconsensual SJT. The trial judge held plaintiffs' counsel in criminal 
contempt for failure to proceed with the SJT. The district court predi-
cated its authority to compel the SJT partly upon Rules 16(a) and 
(c). as 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed 
the lower court and vacated the contempt order. The only issue before 
32. Jd. at 46 (quoting 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAl. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 
1526 (1971); j. MoORE, W. TAGGART & j. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 16.16.1, 
16.22 (2d ed. 1985)). 
33. 115 F.R.D. at 47. 
34. See McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49 (participation in a SJT could be mandated by a trial 
court); Arabian, 119 F.R.D. at 449 (the court may order parties to participate in a SJT); Federal 
Reseroe Bank, 123 F.R.D. at 607 (D. Minn. 1988) (compelled participation in SJTs is consistent 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). See Maatman, The Future of Summary Jury Trials 
in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 455, 455 n.1 (1988). 
35. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 886. 
36. !d. at 887. 
37. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 336. 
38. !d. at 334. 
39. !d. at 335-36. 
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the court of appeals was whether the federal district court had the 
power to compel participation in the nonbinding SJT. The court of 
appeals held that Rule 16 does not authorize district courts to compel 
parties to participate in SJTs!0 
2. The reasoning in Strandell 
The Seventh Circuit rejected the lower court's expansive interpre-
tation of Rule 16.41 The appellate court reasoned that although a dis-
trict court has inherent power to control its docket, it must do so "in 
harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."42 As support for 
its rationale, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Advisory Committee's 
note to Rule 16( c) which provides that the pretrial conference is meant 
to facilitate settlement, not "to impose settlement negotiations on un-
willing litigants."43 The Strandell court interpreted the intent of Rule 
16 as not allowing "an unwilling litigant to be sidetracked from the 
normal course of litigation."" The court also reasoned that Rule 16 
only allowed a trial judge to "explor[ e J the use of procedures other 
than litigation to resolve the dispute," including "urging the litigants to 
employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse."'~ 
The court stated that its decision was consistent with two previous 
Seventh Circuit opinions interpreting Rule 16 as a noncoercive rule.46 
After expressing fear that the mandatory SJT may affect the rules con-
cerning privilege of work product,'7 the Strandell court concluded that 
although a district court may wish to take measures to lessen its 
crowded docket, that court may not "avoid the adjudication of cases 
properly within its congressionally-mandated jurisdiction."48 
C. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp. 
Rule 16(a) provides that the court may "direct the attorneys for 
the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear" for a pretrial 
40. 838 F .2d at 888. 
41. The Seventh Circuit implied that the district court relied erringly on the factors it used to 
reach the conclusion. !d. at 887-88. 
42. !d. at 886. 
43. !d. at 887 (citing FED. R. C1v. P. 16 advisory committee's note). 
44. !d. 
45. /d. (original emphasis). 
46. See ldentiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Sys., 560 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1977); J. 
F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318, 1320 (7th Cir. 
197 6) (per curiam). 
47. 838 F.2d at 888. 
48. /d. 
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conference.49 In Heileman, the Seventh Circuit held that inherent 
power enhances Rule 16 to authorize a court to compel litigants repre-
sented by counsel to attend a pretrial conference.110 This case is impor-
tant because the Seventh Circuit unfortunately broadened the interpre-
tation of Rule 16 which the court had earlier narrowed in Strandell. 111 
1. The facts in Heileman 
At the trial level of Heileman, a corporate defendant refused to 
obey the order of the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin to send a corporate representative with authority to 
settle to a pretrial conference.112 Defendant's counsel contended that he 
and another attorney authorized to speak for the corporate principals 
were in attendance. Defendant's counsel argued that the district court 
lacked the power to compel the corporate principal to appear at the 
pretrial settlement conference. The trial judge imposed a sanction of 
over $5,000. 113 
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed the 
district court's order and held that a court may order attorneys and 
unrepresented parties, but not represented parties, to appear for a set-
tlement conference.114 The Seventh Circuit, on rehearing en bane, va-
cated the panel's decision and upheld the order.1111 
2. The reasoning in Heileman 
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that since the federal rules "do not 
completely describe and limit the power of the federal courts," the 
courts may exercise authority outside of the rules. 116 The court stated 
that district courts possess the inherent power to develop "procedural 
techniques designed to make the operation of the court more efficient, 
to preserve the integrity of the judicial process, and to control courts' 
dockets."117 The court determined that the court's power to compel ap-
pearance of a represented party was, nevertheless, consistent with Rule 
16. In its view, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Rule 16 repre-
sented "another application of a district judge's inherent authority to 
49. FED. R. C1v. P. 16 (emphasis added). 
50. 871 F.2d at 656. 
51. !d. at 651-52. 
52. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wis. 1985). 
53. 871 F.2d at 651. 
54. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415, 1421 (7th Cir. 1988), 
vacated on rehearing 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane). 
55. 871 F.2d at 656-57. 
56. !d. at 651. 
57. Id. 
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preserve the efficiency, and more importantly the integrity, of the judi-
cial process. " 58 
III. RULE 16: ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS 
The focus of this analysis is to examine the weaknesses of the Sev-
enth Circuit's interpretation of Rule 16 in the Strandell and Heileman 
decisions. In Strandell, the Seventh Circuit stated that the only issue 
before it was whether a trial judge could require a litigant to partici-
pate in a SJT to promote settlement of the case.59 The court specifi-
cally stated that it was not asked to "determine the manner in which 
summary jury trials may be used with the consent of the parties."60 By 
means of spotlighting the weaknesses of the reasoning underlying the 
court's decision, this analysis will elucidate the ideas behind the Sev-
enth Circuit's rationale. Specifically, this analysis will show that, with 
respect to the limited issue before it, the court in Strandell decided the 
issue correctly, but now flawlessly. Contrariwise, this analysis will sug-
gest that the decision in Heileman was faulty. 
A. The Seventh Circuit Did Not Narrow the Interpretation of Rule 
16 
Rule 16 is a vehicle for change in bringing about more speedy and 
efficient determinations. 61 The rule does not address all of the proce-
dures that a trial court can use in facilitating pretrial settlement.62 
However, there is a limit to what procedures can be utilized. 
The Strandell opinion displays the limited flexibility of the fed-
eral rules, yet fails to address the necessity for district courts to act so as 
not to disrupt the delicate balance between the competing concerns of 
expediency and individual rights. The decision's failure to constrict ju-
dicial innovation is most evident in its handling of the interpretation of 
Rule 16. The Seventh Circuit had previously given Rule 16 a narrow 
interpretation.63 Though the court held that Rule 16 does not authorize 
mandatory SJTs, the court inadequately relied on the Advisory Com-
58. !d. at 652. 
59. 838 F.2d at 886. 
60. !d. 
61. "Some judges and some lawyers long ago recognized the need for change, and at least a 
few recognized Rule 16, even before amendment, as the vehicle for change." Note, Rule I 6 and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 818, 818-19 (1988). 
62. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 496. 
63. See ldentiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Sys., 560 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1977); J. 
F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318, 1320 (7th C:ir. 
1976) (per curiam). 
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mittee's note on Rule 16(c) as support for its holding. 64 The Seventh 
Circuit should have focused more exactingly on the clear language of 
Rule 16.65 Circuit Judge Manion, in his dissent in Heileman, laid out 
this basic principle: "As with any rule or statute, the proper starting 
point in interpreting Rule 16 is the rule's language. We should not be 
content to rely on general statements about 'liberal construction' and 
Rule 16's 'broadly remedial' 'spirit.' " 66 
B. The Seventh Circuit Did Not Focus on the Clear Language of Rule 
16 
Rule 16 should have been the keystone of the Seventh Circuit's 
reasoning in Strandell. The trial court relied on subsections (7) and 
(11) of section (c); consequently, the Seventh Circuit repeated the view 
of the trial court that these two subsections authorized the mandatory 
SJT.67 The subsections only provide that "[t]he participants ... may 
consider and take action with respect to ... (7) the possibility of settle-
ment or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute" and 
"(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action."68 
The plain language of Rule 16(c) suggests that extrajudicial, not judi-
cial, procedures be discussed at a pretrial conference. The Strandell 
decision states that "while the pretrial conference of Rule 16 was in-
tended to foster settlement through the use of extrajudicial procedures, 
it was not intended to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked 
from the normal course of litigation."69 As one commentator observed, 
"the decision implies that any other interpretation of Rule 16 would 
have signaled that a quiet revolution had occurred in federal pre-trial 
practice."70 The interpretation delineated by the Seventh Circuit in 
Heileman is that "Rule 16's specific language limits a court's authority 
over pretrial proceedings,"71 of which SJTs are included. 
The trial court, quoting Judge Lambros, read Rule 16 in conjunc-
64. 838 F.2d at 887; See Note, Compelling Alternatives: The Authority of Federal Judges to 
Order Summary jury Trial Participation, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 483, 494 (1988) ("Much of 
Strandell's analysis focused not on the text of the Rule, but on a singlr sentence of the Advisory 
Committee notes on Rule 16(c)."). 
65. For example. one illustrative comment seems to decry broad interpretation of Rule 16: "] 
also can find nothing in Rule 16 (pretrial conference) to suggest that judges are authorized to 
convene juries to assist in settlement." Posner, supra note 3, at 385. 
66. 871 F.2d at 666 (Manion,]., dissenting). 
67. !d. 
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
69. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887. 
70. Maatman, supra note 34, at 459-60. Gerald L. Maatman was the attorney for the plain-
tiffs in Strandell. 
71. 848 F.2d at 1421. 
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tion with Rule 1, which provides that the rules be construed "to secure 
the just and speedy determination of an action."72 The Seventh Circuit 
failed to respond with a comment on the interplay between the two 
rules. Perhaps the court's argument that Rule 16 is not meant to be 
coercive could be construed as a response to the seemingly broad cover-
age of Rule 1. The court discerned that no language in the amended 
Rule 16 or in the Advisory Committee's note suggests that the amend-
ments to Rule 16 "were intended to make the rule coercive."73 Rule 16 
points to extrajudicial procedures only as a possible means for arriving 
at a settlement. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit cited with approval 
the Second Circuit's comment on the 1983 version of Rule 16: "Rule 16 
... was not designed as a means for clubbing the parties-or one of 
them-into an involuntary compromise."74 Reconciliation of the two 
rules results when the ostensible broadness of Rule 1 is necessarily tem-
pered by the noncoercive nature of Rule 16. 
1. Strandell 's interpretation of Rule 16 
When SJTs were first introduced in the early 1980s, other forms 
of alternative dispute resolution had already been embraced by the 
courts. 75 Essentially, the development of the law regarding judicial 
power to require participation in SJTs originates in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 16;76 accordingly, the trial court 
cited with approval Judge Lambros' analysis for the court's authority: 
"The Summary Jury Trial is firmly rooted in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. In light of Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, SJT is within the court's 
pretrial powers pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(a)(1), (5), (c)(ll), and the 
court's inherent power to manage and control its docket."77 
While the Seventh Circuit's decision in Strandell should be lauded 
for its curtailment of the district courts' power to excessively liberalize 
the interpretation of federal procedural rules, the decision is lacking in 
several respects. Although the case only mentions briefly the danger of 
overstepping court boundaries and into "congressionally-mandated ju-
72. FED. R. C1v. P. 1; 838 F.2d at 887. 
73. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888. 
74. !d. at 887 (quoting Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
75. See Maatman, supra note 34, at 455. In 1984, the Judicial Conference endorsed the use 
of SJTs as a means of promoting the settlement of cases. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS oF 
THE jUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 88 (Sept. 1984). 
76. For example, "Rule 16(a)(l) and (5) and (c)(11) has been cited as a basis for the utiliza-
tion of summary jury trial procedures." Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 
448 (M D Fla. 1988). 
77. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 335; Lambros, supra note 4, 103 F.R.D. at 469. 
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risdiction,"78 the major forte of the Strandell opinion remains its ad-
herence to staying within judicial bounds, i.e., leaving the power to 
amend or alter federal rules that affect substantive rights in the hands 
of the legislature. In its decision, the court recognizes the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure as a product of a process designed to take into ac-
count the protection of individual rights.79 
One strength of Strandell is its emphasis on the damage that 
could be inflicted upon the work product rule if SJTs were to be made 
compulsory. If the plaintiffs in Strandell had been required to partici-
pate in the SJT, they would have conceivably had to divulge privileged 
testimonies of witnesses. The federal district court at the trial level had 
previously denied the defendants' motion to compel production of the 
privileged work product.8° Consequently, an attempt to force plaintiffs 
to submit to the SJT procedure, thereby causing them to disclose privi-
leged information, would upset the "carefully-crafted balance between 
the needs for pretrial disclosure and party confidentiality."81 Again, the 
court was not hesitant to mention that such an attempt would alter the 
"judgments contained in Rule 26 and in the case law."82 
The emphasis on the work product privilege was necessary; how-
ever, without more analysis and illustration of the inherent power doc-
trine and the interpretation of the federal rules, the emphasis leaves a 
false impression of the importance of the work product privilege. In-
stead, the rationale behind the inextricable ideas of inherent power and 
interpretation of rules should have been given the limelight. The Sev-
enth Circuit failed to point out how a court's compelling plaintiffs' at-
torney to participate in the SJT would force the attorney to reveal the 
privileged information. Judge Posner offered the suggestion that "an 
attorney who did not want to make his 'trump card' available to the 
opposition before trial, could merely withhold that piece of evidence 
from the summary proceeding."83 The above criticisms are offered as a 
means to determine that the Strundell case inadequately addressed and 
established the boundaries of Rule 16. 
78. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888. 
79. Id. at 886 (quoting S. REP. No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. 
Com: CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 3023, 3026). 
80. Strandell v. Jackson County, 7 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 715 (S.D. Ill. 1986). 
81. 838 F.2d at 888. 
82. Id. 
83. Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CI.EV. ST. L. REv. 43, 54 ( 1980). 
170 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 4 
2. Heileman's interpretation of Rule 16 
Although the majority in Heileman was correct in stating what 
Rule 16 addresses, the use of pretrial conferences and the discussion of 
means for dispensing with unnecessary litigation,84 the majority was 
incorrect in holding that Rule 16 allows federal district courts to com-
pel a represented party's appearance at pretrial settlement confer-
ences.85 The clear language of Rule 16 operates against any such hold-
ing. As one of the dissenting judges in Heileman so emphatically 
stressed, "the rule mandates in clear and unambiguous terms that 
only an unrepresented party litigant and attorneys may be ordered to 
appear."86 
The arguments against the majority's holding can be categorized 
into three basic propositions. The first proposition embodies the idea 
that Rule 16 specifically addresses who may be compelled to appear at 
the pretrial conference. That only attorneys and unrepresented parties 
may be required to participate in pretrial conferences is manifestly ex-
pressed by the rule's multiple references to "attorneys" and "unrepre-
sented parties." Rule 16(a) provides that a court may direct the "attor-
neys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before 
it."87 Rule 16(b) states that a judge may enter scheduling orders after 
"consulting with the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented 
parties."88 Rule 16(c) requires that "[a]t least one of the attorneys for 
each party participating in any conference before trial shall have au-
thority to enter into stipulations. "89 Rule 16(d) directs that the final 
pretrial conference be attended by "one of the attorneys who will con-
duct the trial for each of the parties and by any unrepresented par-
ties. "9° Finally, Rule 16(f) allows sanctions if there is no appearance 
made "on behalf of a party."91 Judge Manion points out that the "only 
language in Rule 16(f) specifically addressing appearance does not au-
thorize sanctions if 'a party fails to appear.' "92 He observes that the 
"choice of language is significant. In the normal course, an attorney 
appears 'on behalf of' a represented client at a pretrial conference."93 It 
appears, then, that the distinction between represented parties and un-
84. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 650. 
85. /d. at 652. 
86. /d. at 658 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (original emphasis). 
87. Fw. R. CIV. P. 16. 
88. /d. 
89. /d. 
90. /d. 
91. /d. 
92. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 667 (Manion, J., dissenting) (original emphasis). 
93. !d. 
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represented parties was intended by the framers of Rule 16. Though 
the majority opinion neglected to place importance on this distinction, it 
did make the following admission: 
The language of Rule 16 does not give any direction to the district 
court upon the issue of a court's authority to order litigants who are 
represented by counsel to appear for pretrial proceedings. Instead, 
Rule 16 merely refers to the partlClpation of trial advo-
cates-attorneys of record and pro se litigants. 94 
Consequently, in stating that Rule 16 did not "limit the power of the 
federal rules,"911 the majority had to rely on authority external to Rule 
16 to reach its conclusion. 
The second proposition used in the argument against the majority 
opinion was entirely unaddressed by the majority in Heileman. The 
second basic proposition was stated by Judge Manion: "Rule 16's dis-
tinction between represented and unrepresented parties is consistent 
with a litigant's statutory right to representation by an attorney."96 The 
role of the attorney is one of advocate for her client. Attorneys are often 
hired for their ability to effectively persuade the judge or jury and to 
present the client's case with the courtroom skills and legal knowledge 
which the client may lack. Moreover, as Judge Posner explains, attor-
neys are hired by clients to "economize on their own investment of time 
in resolving disputes. " 97 The drafters of amended Rule 16 envisioned 
that their choice of language would undergo a scrutinizing process. 
It is incredible to believe that after this careful process, amended Rule 
16 would expressly authorize district courts to order only attorneys 
and unrepresented parties to appear if the drafters also intended to 
allow district courts to order represented parties to appear. This is 
especially so given Rule 16's consistent distinction between repre-
sented and unrepresented parties, and that distinction's congruence 
with the statutory right to representation by an attorney and the at-
torney's traditional role in litigation.98 
The Seventh Circuit would have been wise to follow Judge Manion's 
caution that courts should not "presume that Rule 16's drafters meant 
to encroach on a litigant's right to conduct his case through counsel."99 
The third basic proposition used in the argument against the ma-
jority opinion was presented by Judge Posner. He believed that though 
94. Jd. at 651. 
95. Jd. 
96. 871 F.2d at 667 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
97. Jd. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 668 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
99. Id. at 667. 
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the panel concluded that Rule 16 carries the negative implication that 
no represented party may be directed to appear, Heileman could have 
been decided on a narrower ground. 100 Judge Posner posited that 
"neither Rule 16 nor any other rule, statute, or doctrine imposes [a 
duty to bargain in good faith over settlement before resorting to trial] 
on federal litigants." He stated that Heileman could have been decided 
on the ground that the magistrate abused his discretion in ordering the 
defendant to "send an executive having 'full settlement authority' to the 
pretrial conference." 101 
IV. INHERENT PowER: ANALYSIS oF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
DECISIONS 
In both Strandell and Heileman, the Seventh Circuit attempted to 
argue that Rule 16 answered the question at hand. Because Rule 16 
did not do so, the court in Heileman alternatively relied on the inherent 
power doctrine. The undue reliance on the inherent power of the court 
broadened the doctrine's applicability. As a result, the Seventh Circuit 
fostered the development of new problems by expanding the inherent 
power doctrine. 102 
A. The Decision Provided a Weak Bridle for the Inherent Power 
Doctrine 
Although the Seventh Circuit in Strandell properly held that the 
district court's power to control and manage its docket does not extend 
to requiring participation in SJTs, the court's decision did not go far 
enough. The Strandell court should have delineated more clearly the 
limitations of the inherent power of federal courts. In Heileman, the 
court held that Rule 16 did not limit the inherent power of federal 
courts to order represented parties to attend pretrial conferences. Vigor-
ously opposed by several of the circuit judges, this holding allowed the 
inherent power doctrine to be unnecessarily expanded. 
Besides Rule 16, the other cited authority for mandatory SJTs in 
Strandell was the inherent power of the courts. 103 The Seventh Circuit 
appropriately emphasized the trial court's admission that "its discretion 
in this context is not unbridled."104 Although the decision in Strandell 
affirmatively stated the limitation that courts must exercise inherent 
100. ld. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. at 658. 
102. See Tornquist, The Active judge in Pretrial Settlement: Inherent Authority Gone Awry, 
25 Wn.LAMETTt: L. Rt:v. 743, 746 (1989). 
103. 838 F.2d at 886. 
104. /d. (quoting Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 335). 
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powers in "harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"105 
that brief mention was insufficient. The United States Supreme Court, 
in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, had already issued this admonitory 
remark: "Because inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic 
controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion."106 The 
Supreme Court's statement (or a paraphrase of that statement) was not 
embodied as a precedential citation in either Strandell or Heileman. 
The Strandell and Heileman majority decisions were remiss in 
pointing out how several cases set limits to the inherent power. For 
example, in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 107 the inherent power was 
limited to dismissing a case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. In 
Roadway, the inherent power was limited to imposition of attorney's 
fees for bad faith litigation. 108 The Supreme Court held that any sanc-
tion ordered by virtue of the courts' inherent power had to be grounded 
in bad faith conduct or conduct tantamount to bad faith. 109 Several 
post-Roadway courts restricted the judiciary's inherent powers in im-
posing sanctions. 110 
When dealing with problems of interpretation within the federal 
rules, the courts first look to the rules themselves. If the rules fail to 
specifically address the issue, the courts look to authority outside of the 
rules. According to the Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, the 
federal rules "contain numerous grants of authority that supplement 
the inherent power of the court to manage litigation. Of particular im-
portance are those contained in Rule 16, 26, 37, and 42."111 The Sev-
enth Circuit erred in Strandell when it failed to look at the particular 
word choice in Rule 16. If it had done so, there may have been no need 
to look to the inherent power doctrine. 
Some examples of the Seventh Circuit's failure to closely examine 
the language of Rule 16 are seen in the Strandell case. Conceivably, 
the court could have elaborated on the term "extrajudicial" found in 
Rule 16(c)(7). The Advisory Committee's note to the 1983 amendments 
to Rule 16(c)(7) imply a possible link between the terms "extrajudi-
cial" and "outside the courthouse" in the following statement: "This 
105. /d. at 886. 
106. 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). 
107. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962). 
108. 447 U.S. at 766-67. 
109. /d. at 767. 
110. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986) (concluding that sanctions must 
be supported by a finding of bad faith); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 
1983) (determining that sanctions had to be based on a party's bad faith-an unreasonable posi-
tion that was "without at least a colorable basis in law"); See generally Nizamoff & Wodock, 
Inherent Power Sanctions: Why Me, 0 Lord?, 55 DEF. CouNs. J. 58, 59-60 (1988). 
111. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D, supra note 7, § 23.11, at 160. 
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includes urging the litigants to employ adjudicatory techniques outside 
the courthouse." 112 As one commentator explained, "A summary jury 
trial is hardly an extrajudicial proceeding. Indeed, a summary jury trial 
is conducted inside the courtroom of a federal courthouse, before an 
Article III judge, and with jurors selected from the court's master jury 
wheel who are paid from congressionally apportioned funds." 113 The 
examination of specific terms within Rule 16 is only suggested to point 
out the necessity for following the clear language of the rule. Had the 
court applied a literal interpretation, it might have quickly brushed 
aside a portion of the district court's stated authority for the mandatory 
SJT. 
The court in Strandell should have distinguished the difference 
between pretrial conferences and SJTs. In contrast, the court in AicKay 
felt that SJTs could be used as extended pretrial conferences. 114 More-
over, the Arabian court reasoned that "[ w ]hat ever name the judge may 
give to these proceedings," SJTs and conferences are similar and Rule 
16 sanctions themY 6 However, SJTs and conferences are not the same. 
The Strandell court could have armed its decision with analysis to the 
contrary. The distinction could have been readily made by referring to 
the actual text of Rule 16 and the accompanying Advisory Committee 
note. 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit should have also distinguished a 
settlement conference from a SJT. The lower court in Heileman dis-
agreed with Lockhart in that the Lockhart court sanctioned the district 
court's power to order attendance at settlement conferences. 116 Assum-
ing, arguendo, that the SJT and the settlement conference are indistin-
guishable, the Strandell court failed to imply that a court's order re-
quiring the attendance of the parties might be "so onerous, so clearly 
unproductive, or so expensive in relation to the size, value, and com-
plexity of the case" that it would be an abuse of discretion to order the 
parties themselves to attend a settlement conference. 117 
Finally, though the SJT is not a settlement negotiation/ 18 the 
court in Strandell could have more convincingly characterized the SJT 
as a procedure leading to and closely conjunctive with a settlement ne-
gotiation. Infelicitously, the court relied on the Advisory Committee 
note's implication that Rule 16(c) was not intended to "impose settle-
112. 818 F.2d at R87 (quotin~ Frn. R. Crv. P. 16 advisory committee's note). 
113. \laatman. supra note 34. at 47H. 
114. McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 41, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988). 
115. Arabian American Oil Co. v .. ~carfone. 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988). 
116. 848 F.2d at 1420. 
117. Heileman, 107 F.R.D. at 217. 
118. Note, Compelling Alternatives, supra note 64, at 494. 
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ment negotiations on unwilling litigants."119 Although the SJT and the 
settlement negotiation were improperly conjoined, that association is 
not fatal to the Strandell analysis. 
B. A Limitation of the Inherent Power in Strandell May Have Pre-
vented the Heileman Outcome 
The remainder of this comment will discuss other points in which 
the Seventh Circuit's rationale with regard to the inherent power doc-
trine was lacking. First, the analysis to follow will examine the dissent-
ing opinions in Heileman with the purpose of highlighting language 
which, if hypothetically inserted in the Strandell decision, may have 
affected the outcome in Heileman. Second, this comment will propose 
that the Seventh Circuit could have more assertively set bounds for the 
judiciary and cautioned courts against treading upon the realm of the 
legislature. 
In light of the dissenting opinions and the proposition that this 
comment attempts to support, it is suggested that Judge Manion set 
adequate limitations on the inherent power doctrine. "Inherent power 
is not a license for federal courts to do whatever seems necessary to 
move a case along. Inherent power is simply 'another name for the 
power of courts to make common law when statutes and rules do not 
address a particular area.' " 120 The justices who authored the dissent-
ing opinions effectively bolstered their argument that the inherent 
power doctrine is limited. "Since inherent power's purpose is to fill 
gaps left by statute or rule," Judge Manion continues, "it necessarily 
follows that where a statute or rule specifically addresses a particular 
area, it is inappropriate to invoke inherent power to exceed the bounds 
the statute or rule sets." 121 Though more applicable in disputing the 
expansive holding of Heileman, this limitation is readily apropos in 
arguing against the interpretation of Rule 16 in Strandell. 
Judge Ripple curtails the enlargement of the inherent power doc-
trine by limiting judicial officers to "a substantial degree of inherent 
authority to deal with individual situations-as long as that authority is 
exercised in conformity with the policies embodied in the national 
rules."122 Not only would inherent power be limited by the federal 
rules themselves but also by the policies embodied in the federal rules. 
Judge Posner admonished against the "obvious dangers in too 
119. FED. R. C1v. P. 16 advisory committee's note. 
120. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting) (quoting Soo Line R.R. Co. v. 
Escanaba & Lake Superior R.R. Co., 840 F.2d 546, 551 (7tb Cir. 1988)). 
121. 871 F.2d at 666 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
122. !d. at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
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broad an interpretation of the federal courts' inherent power to regulate 
their procedure."123 The Seventh Circuit's brief acknowledgement in 
Strandell of the district court's "substantial inherent power to control 
and to manage its docket" was insufficient. 124 The freedom to interpret 
inherent power expansively is subject to constitutional constraints not-
withstanding the language of Article III of the Constitution. 
The Heileman court relied on the inherent power doctrine because 
of Rule 16's failure to give direction upon the specific issue before the 
court. If the Seventh Circuit in Strandell had elaborated on Rule 16's 
limitation, then the Seventh Circuit may have decided Heileman rely-
ing on the precedent set in Strandell and, therefore, may not have been 
tempted to reach out to the inherent power doctrine to bolster its hold-
ing. If it were possible to take language from a yet undecided case 
(Heileman) and insert it in the case at hand (Strandell), then Judge 
Coffey's elaboration on the limited application of Rule 16 may have 
been instrumental in averting the outcome in Heileman. Judge Coffey 
elucidates what the Strandell court failed to point out-the inextricable 
relationship between the inherent power doctrine and the federal rules: 
The majority upsets [the appropriate balance between the needs for 
judicial efficiency and the rights of the individual litigant] and acts 
contrary to the Supreme Court's mandate in the Bank of Nova Sco-
tia case when it relies upon an alleged "inherent authority" to permit 
district court judges to exercise a power which the drafters of Rule 16 
explicitly denied them.m 
The statement in Strandell that the inherent power must be "exercised 
in a manner that is in harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure"126 is too weak to prevent the outcome in Heileman. The Seventh 
Circuit in Strandell should have used more forceful language, i.e, simi-
lar to Judge Coffey's declaration that the "newly created 'inherent au-
thority' ... is based upon a legal foundation of quicksand."127 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. District Courts Should Beware Rash Procedural Innovations that 
Infringe on Substantive Rights 
The district courts within the Seventh Circuit should be careful as 
they innovate with various procedures. "The delicate balance between 
123. !d. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
124. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 886. 
125. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 660 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
126. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 886. 
127. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 661 (Coffey,]., dissenting). 
157] RULE 16/INHERENT POWER 177 
efficiency and fairness created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
is altered by procedural innovation."128 Professor Resnik has observed 
that "the history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the 
problems created by the preceding generation's procedural reforms." 129 
Judicial activism, in the form of procedural innovation that infringes on 
substantive rights, should be curtailed. 130 
The methods used to encourage pretrial settlement should be care-
fully scrutinized. 131 For instance, the Manual for Complex Litigation, 
Second, cautions "that the role of the judge in settlement is an uncer-
tain one and recommends judicial restraint in several respects. " 132 
"Neither the bench nor the bar agrees on the role a trial judge should 
play in bringing about a settlement."133 The Seventh Circuit in 
Strandell and Heileman did not argue that the mandatory SJT and the 
compulsory pretrial conference attendance were possibly outcome-deter-
minative according to the Supreme Court's Colgrove134 test. The court 
could have asserted that the Colgrove test should be applied on a case-
by-case basis. In the particular factual situation of Strandell, the Sev-
enth Circuit could have successfully defended the mandatory SJT as an 
excessive intrusion into the independence of plaintiffs' attorney. 135 Fur-
thermore, the Seventh Circuit could have reasonably submitted that a 
mandatory SJT would have been determinative of the ultimate outcome 
of the litigation, given Strandell's particular factual scenario. In Heile-
man, the court did not argue that the substantive right to representa-
tion by counsel may be affected by the court's order to compel the rep-
resented party's appearance at the pretrial conference. 
128. Tornquist, supra note 102, at 744. 
129 Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 603, 624 (1985). 
130. Contra Lambros, supra note 1, at 806. Judge Lambros believes that trial judges should 
"take an active role in managing and administering their dockets. And in this sense, I consider 
myself a judicial activist, a procedural judicial activist." !d. However, as Lambros elaborates, 
"[P]rocedural activism is in no way related to substantive activism. While substantive activism is 
concerned with philosophical questions concerning the application of our Constitution, procedural 
activism addresses only the means of processing disputes." /d. 
131. See Tornquist, supra note 102, at 747. See Heileman, 871 F.2d at 658 (Coffey, J., 
dissenting, joined by Easterbrook, Ripple & Manion). 
132. Simons, The Manual for Complex Litigation: More Rules or Mere Recommendations?, 
62 ST JoHN's L. REv. 493, 502 (1988). "Despite the [Manual's] status in the law as only a set 
of recommendations, it has the force and effect of law since it is frequently cited as a primary 
source of procedural authority." !d. at 498; see, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Engine In-
terchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 n.20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979). 
133. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D, supra, note 7, § 23.11, at 160. 
134. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973), construed in McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 
F.R.D. 43, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1988). In Colgrove, the Supreme Court reasoned that a local rule 
could be upheld based on its non-interference with "those aspects of the litigatory process which 
bear upon the ultimate outcome of the litigation." 413 U.S. at 155. 
135. See McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 45-46. 
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The Seventh Circuit failed to accentuate the demarcation between 
the roles of the judiciary and the legislature. As the Seventh Circuit 
perceived in an earlier case, "the ease and speed with which the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure can be amended by those whom Congress 
entrusted with the responsibility for doing so should make federal 
judges hesitate to create new forms of judicial proceedings in the teeth 
of existing rules."136 The power to order mandatory SJTs requires an 
amendment to Rule 16. Similarly, Rule 16 requires amendment in or-
der to allow compulsion of represented parties to appear at pretrial 
conferences. 
B. The Seventh Circuit Should Set the Boundary Between the judici-
ary and the Legislature 
The Seventh Circuit aptly emphasized that the federal rules "are a 
product of a careful process of study and reflection" which reflects the 
responsibilities of the legislature and the judiciary.137 The court also 
acknowledged that the rules are cognizant "both of the need for expedi-
tion of cases and the protection of individual rights." 138 Therefore, it 
should follow that where the Supreme Court and Congress have ad-
dressed "the appropriate balance between the needs for judicial effi-
ciency and the rights of the individual litigant," innovations such as 
mandatory SJT and mandatory appearance of represented parties at 
pretrial conference "must conform to that balance." 139 If the district 
court in Heileman is to be granted the power to remove a litigant's 
right to representation by counsel, then "let it be accomplished through 
the accepted channels of the Supreme Court and Congress of the 
URited States."140 
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the Rules Enabling Act which 
"reflects the joint responsibility of the legislative and judicial branches 
of government." 141 The federal rules are promulgated under the aegis 
of the Rules Enabling Act. The Act provides that the federal rules 
"shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 142 The 
Rules Enabling Act also limits the Supreme Court's power to establish 
rules governing the federal district courts. The Supreme Court, for in-
stance, must consider the substantive rights of individuals in construing 
136. Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1987). 
137. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 886. 
138. !d. (quoting S. REP. No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 L:.s. Com: 
CoNG. & ADMIN. Nt:ws 3023, 3026). 
139. !d. at 887. 
140. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 663 (Coffey, j., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
141. !d. at 671; See 28 USC.§ 2072 (1982). 
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 ( 1982). 
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the federal rules. 143 
That the Seventh Circuit realized any amendment to substantive 
rights within the federal rules to be outside the scope of the judiciary is 
evident in its cautionary statement, "we can expect that the national 
rule-making process outlined in the Rules Enabling Act will undertake 
[such radical surgery] in quite an explicit fashion." 144 The Seventh Cir-
cuit should be cognizant of the need for separation of legislative and 
judicial powers; however, its decision in Strandell failed to sufficiently 
emphasize that necessary distinction, and its decision in Heileman 
failed to apply that distinction. Noting that the majority misapplied and 
inappropriately expanded the inherent power doctrine, Judge Ripple 
postulated that the Rules Enabling Act "hardly contemplates the broad, 
amorphous, definition of the 'inherent power of the district judge,' ... 
articulated by the majority."1411 
Legislation has been proposed to Congress to amend the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to allow federal district judges to enter orders 
governing consensual SJTs.146 "The fact that such legislation has been 
offered intimates that statutory authority under Rule 16 is lacking," 
argues one commentator. 147 The Seventh Circuit's oversight in not em-
phasizing the separation of rule-making power demonstrates that the 
analytical basis of the Strandell decision was incomplete. Conse-
quently, the insufficient Strandell opinion permitted the subsequent 
case of Heileman to broaden not only the interpretation of federal rules 
but also the inherent power doctrine. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Strandell v. Jackson 
County reversed the lower court's decision and thereby removed from 
its district courts the power to compel participation in nonbinding 
SJTs. While this accomplishment is commendable, the court did not go 
far enough in limiting the inherent power doctrine and in narrowing 
the interpretation of Rule 16. Nor did the court satisfactorily stress in 
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. joseph Oat Corp. that the proper bound-
ary between the judiciary and legislature precluded any broadening of 
the inherent power doctrine or the interpretation of the federal rules. 
The Seventh Circuit has transformed from a tribunal that has limited 
the discretion of district courts to read Rule 16 as compelling 
143. /d. 
144. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888 (footnote omitted). 
145. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
146. See H.R. 473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 133 CoNG. REC. 157 (1987) ("Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1987"); S. 2038, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 132 CoNG. REC. 
848 ( 1986) ("Alternative Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1986"). As of date, the bills have 
not been enacted. See Lambros, supra note 1, at 804. 
147. Maatman, supra note 34, at 479. 
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mandatory SJTs into a tribunal that allows district courts to compel 
action that diverges from the specific language and intent of Rule 16. 
This shift in the court's view is disturbing because it connotes an un-
willingness to curb the expansion of judicial constraints intrinsic to the 
rules and statutes by which the judiciary is to abide. 
Farol Parco 
